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Abstract
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects
have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides
very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval
voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round
elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic com-
putations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics
(in two-round elections) or they just vote sincerely (in single transferable vote
elections).
1 Introduction
One of the most celebrated pieces of work in political science is due to Maurice Du-
verger whose comparison of electoral systems in the 1950s showed that proportional
representation creates conditions favourable to foster multi-party development, while
the plurality system tends to favour a two-party pattern (Duverger 1951). To explain
these differences, Duverger drew a distinction between mechanical and psychological
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effects. The mechanical effect corresponds to the transformation of votes into seats.
The psychological effect can be viewed as the anticipation of the mechanical system:
voters are aware that there is a threshold of representation (Lijphart 1994), and they
decide not to support parties that are likely to be excluded because of the mechanical
effect.
Since then, strategic voting has been considered as the central explanation of
the psychological effect (Cox 1997). The assumption of rational individuals voting
strategically has been intensively used as a tool in formal models, which inspire most
of the contemporary works on electoral systems (Taagepera 2007). In this vein,
Myerson & Weber (1993) and Cox (1997) have provided models of elections using
the assumption of strategic voters which yield results compatible with Duverger’s
observations.
These models have had widespread appeal but are simultaneously extensively
debated (Green & Shapiro 1994). In particular, the assumption of rational forward-
looking voters seems to be at odd with a number of empirical studies of voters’
behavior. Following the lines of the pessimistic view of the 19th century elitist
theories, decades of survey research have concluded to the limited capacities of the
electorate to behave rationally, lacking coherence of preferences (Lazarsfeld & al.
1948), basic information about political facts (Delli Caprini & Keeter 1991), and
cognitive skills to elaborate strategies (for comprehensive and critical review, see
Kinder 1983, Sniderman 1993 and Kuklinski & Quirk 2000). In his survey of strategic
voting in the U.K., Fisher (2004 : 163) posits that “no one fulfils the abstract
conception of a short-term instrumentally rational voter in real life”. Yet, Riker
claims that “the evidence renders it undeniable that a large amount of sophisticated
voting occurs — mostly to the disadvantage of the third parties nationally — so that
the force of Duverger’s psychological factor must be considerable” (Riker 1982: 764).
There is an obvious contradiction between these two streams of literature. Yet,
testing the existence of rational strategic behavior at the individual level with survey
data is fraught with difficulties. Indeed, rational choice theory postulates that voters
cast their vote in order to maximize some expected utility function, given their beliefs
on how other voters will behave in the election. Testing for this kind of behavior
requires measuring voters’ preferences among the various candidates as well as their
beliefs on how their own vote will affect the outcome of the election.
One route to test for rational strategic behavior from electoral survey data has
been to use proxies for voters’ relevant beliefs such as the viability of candidates
(Alvarez & Nagler 2000, Blais & Bodet 2006). The basic approach is to deter-
mine whether the so-called viability of candidates (the likelihood that they win the
election) is significant when modelling individual vote choice. This is generally con-
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sidered as an approximation of the core idea of the rational choice theory of voting,
i.e. that voters try to maximize the utility of their vote. However, these proxies are
a ’far cry’ from the concept of a pivotal vote, which is central in the rational choice
model (Aldrich 1993).To overcome these difficulties, this paper proposes to study
strategic voting in the laboratory. We have conducted a series of experiments where
subjects are voters, asked to vote to elect a candidate from a fixed set of five candi-
dates. This experimental setting allows us to control for individual preferences for
the various candidates (which are monetary induced) and for the information they
have regarding the respective chances of the various candidates (thanks to repeated
elections).
The aim of this paper is to test whether the behavior of individuals, in such
a favourable context, complies with expectations built on rational choice theory.
Our hypothesis is that it all depends on the complexity of the strategic reasoning
entailed by the voting rule. Four different electoral systems are used as treatments.
Besides the one-round plurality (labeled 1R in the sequel) and two-round majority
(2R) voting rules we were primarily interested in, we also run some experiments under
approval voting (AV) and the single transferable vote with Hare transfers (STV), also
known as the alternative vote1, to add additional evidence about the importance of
the level of complexity – the idea being that strategic calculi are quite easy under
AV and extremely difficult under STV.
Under one round plurality voting rule, the recommendations of the strategic the-
ory at the individual level are quite simple. The voter should vote for the candidate
yielding the highest utility among the viable candidates. In two-round elections also,
there is no point in voting for a non-viable candidate, but this must be completed
by more complex reasoning. For example, there is as well no point in voting for a
candidate which is sure to make it to the second round. Indeed, one might consider
that if her vote is pivotal, this is more likely between the second and third ranked
candidates. Besides, if one is sure that a candidate that she likes will make it to the
second round, it might be in her interest to vote for a candidate that she does not
like if this candidate will more surely be defeated in the second round, thus fostering
the chances of her favoured candidate. Such complex and counter-intuitive consid-
erations may be beyond the cognitive skills of ordinary voters, or may simply not
convince them. The assumption we want to test is that when strategic considera-
tions are simple to compute and formulate, strategic voting is a good description of
individual behavior, but that it fails to account for individual choices when it implies
1Although the latter label is more common in political science, we use in the text the label
”single transferable vote”. It is the label we used in the experiment, because we thought it might
help subjects understand the mechanism of vote transfers.
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too demanding computations, as under the two round voting rule. Furthermore, in
situations where the rational choice model performs poorly, we want to know if voters
vote sincerely, or if they rely on simpler rules of thumb or heuristics.
Closely related to our work are a series of experiments on voting rules in three
candidate elections, which examine under which conditions the minority-preferred
candidate wins in elections where a majority of voters is split between two majority-
preferred candidates. Felsenthal et al. (1988), Forsythe & al. (1993 and 1996), under
the plurality voting rule, study various public coordinating signals, such as pre-
election polls or repeated elections, making it certain that majority voters successfully
coordinate on one of the majority-preferred candidates. Morton and Rietz (2008)
examine the effects of runoff elections in these split-majority electorate, showing that
under two-round voting rules, a minority-preferred candidate has much fewer chances
of winning the election that under plurality (even with public coordinating signals).
Forsythe & al. (1996) study approval voting and the Borda rule as well; again, the
minority candidate is more often defeated than under plurality.2
Contrary to those experiments, we are interested in a symmetrically distributed
electorate and a more fragmented set of options from which to select (five candidates
instead of three), and we have a larger electorate (21 or 63 voters compared to 14 in
most of those experiments). The preference profile we use does not stem from the
literature on voting paradoxes but mimics a simple one-dimensional political land-
scape. It turns out that, in this familiar setting, strategic behavior may be more
complex than in the three-way races previously studied.3 And indeed, our conclu-
sion sharply differs from that of Rietz (2008) when summarizing the main lessons to
be drawn from those experiments, namely that ”Again, in the experimental tests,
voters’ actions appear largely rational and equilibria appear consistent with rational
modelling” (p. 895). We will rather conclude that indeed, when strategic recom-
mendations are simple, as in one-round elections, voters’ behavior is satisfactorily
explained by rational choice theory, but this result does not hold under two-round
elections with a preference profile and a set of candidates generating more complex
computations.
Also related to our work are experiments exploring voters’ strategic decisions in
other voting settings, such as strategic participation and voter turnout, or strategic
2Also with three candidates, Béhue, Favardin and Lepelley (2008) demonstrate that the notion of
“manipulation” or “strategic voting” must be defined as a dynamic concept, as the voter’s reaction
to her information. Under the Borda rule, Kube and Puppe (2009) show that voters tend to vote
strategically if they have information about the other voters’ votes.
3For example, in Morton and Rietz (2008) analysis of two-round elections, voting sincerely for
one’s preferred candidate is a dominating strategy for minority voters, but this phenomenon does
not exist in our one-dimensional setting.
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voting and information aggregation in committees. For a survey on these experi-
ments, see Palfrey (2006). In particular, more closely related to our project is an
experiment by Herzberg and Wilson (1988) focussing on the impact of complexity
on the prevalence of strategic behavior in the context of agenda-controlled commitee
decisions. Seminal experiments by Plott and Levine (1978) concluded that in a fixed
agenda single meeting committee, myopic-voting rules yielded accurate description
of voters’ behavior. Herzberg and Wilson (1988) explicitly test whether complexity
affects individuals’ strategic choices by varying the length of the agenda, starting
with the hypothesis that the longer the agenda, the more difficult strategic compu-
tations are. Unexpectedly, they find little evidence supporting their conjecture about
the impact of complexity on strategic choices. Rather, it seems that the frequency
of sophisticated choices by voters is bell-shaped in the level of complexity. In our
experiment we are also interested in varying the level of complexity of the strategic
decisions, but rather than using the length of an agenda in a sequential voting game,
we use various voting rules.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section (2) describes
the experiments. Section 3 presents the aggregate results. The following section
(4) proposes our models of individual voting for one round and two round elections.
Section 5 tests the models with the individual data and presents a cognitive expla-
nation to our findings. Section 6 corroborates the findings using evidence from AV
and STV elections, and section 7 concludes. A Technical Appendix contains some
further details about the data analysis.
2 The experimental protocol
The basic protocol is as follows. 21 (63, in six sessions) subjects vote among five
alternative candidates, labeled candidates A, B, C, D and E, symmetrically located
at five distinct points on an axis, presented as going from left to right, from 0 to 20:
an extreme left candidate (A, in position 1), a moderate left (B, in position 6), a
centrist (C, in position 10), a moderate right (D, in position 14), and an extreme
right (E, in position 19).
Each subject is randomly assigned a position on this axis (see below for a descrip-
tion of this assignment). The monetary incentive for a subject is that the elected
candidate be as close as possible to her position. Subjects are informed that they
will be paid 20 Euros (or Canadian dollars) minus the distance between the elected
candidate’s position and their own position. For instance (this is the example given
in the instructions), a voter whose assigned position is 11 will receive 10 euros if
candidate A wins, 12 if E wins, 15 if B, 17 if D, and 19 if C.
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The set of options and the payoff scheme are identical for all elections. The main
treatment is to vary the electoral system. In each group, the first two series of four
elections are alternatively held under one-round (1R) and two round (2R) voting
rules. In some sessions, one more series is held under approval voting (AV) or single
transferable vote (STV). The four elections in each series are held with the same
voting rule, this being explained at the beginning of each series. For each series,
participants are assigned a randomly drawn position on the 0 to 20 axis. There
are a total of 21 positions, and each participant has a different position. (For large
groups three subjects have the same position.) The participants are informed about
the distribution of positions: they know their own position, they know that each
possible position is filled exactly once (or thrice in sessions with 63 students) but
they do not know by whom. Voting is anonymous. After each election, ballots are
counted and the results (the five candidates’ scores) are publicly announced.4
After the initial series of four elections, the participants are assigned new positions
and the group moves to the second set of four elections, held under a different rule
and, in some sessions, to a third series of four elections. The participants are informed
from the beginning that one of the eight or twelve elections will be randomly drawn as
the “decisive” election, the one which will actually determine payoffs.5 Cooperation
and communication among voters are banned.
We performed 23 such sessions in Lille, France (4 sessions, of which two featuring
63 subjects6), Montreal, Canada (8 sessions, of which four featuring 63 subjects),
and Paris, France (11 sessions, of which six sessions include a third series under AV,
and four sessions include a third series under STV), with a total of 734 participants.7
Information about each experiment (date, location, number of subjects, treatments)
is provided in Table 1.8
Before turning to the individual level analysis of the data, which is the main focus
of the paper, we briefly present the aggregate electoral outcomes.
4In STV elections, the whole counting process occurs publicly in front of the subjects, eliminating
the candidate with the lowest score and transferring ballots from one candidate to the others.
5This is customary in experimental economics; this has the advantage of keeping the subjects
equally interested in all elections and of avoiding insurance effects; see Davis & Holt (1993).
6In fact, large groups in Lille were composed of 61 and 64 students, because of technical problems.
This does not seem to have any effect on the quality of the data.
7In Montreal and Paris, subjects are students (from all fields) recruited from subject pools
(subject pool from the CIRANO experimental economics laboraratory in Montreal, and from the
Laboratoire d’économie expérimentale de Paris in Paris). In Lille, the experiments took place in
classrooms, during a first year course in political science.
8The full instructions that were delivered to subjects are available from the authors upon request.
6
3 Aggregate electoral outcomes
We first describe how many of the elections were won by the various candidates.
Whatever the voting rule, the extremist candidates (A and E) are never elected.
In 1R, respectively 2R elections, candidate C (the centrist candidate, a Condorcet
winner in our case) is elected in 49%, respectively 54%, of the elections. Things are
quite different in AV and STV elections. In AV elections, C is almost always elected
(79% of the elections), and in STV elections, C is never elected.
Figure 1 indicates the percentage of votes (averaged over our 23 sessions) obtained
by the candidates ranked first, second, third, fourth and last over the course of the
four elections held under the same voting rule (from first to last), for each electoral
system. In the case of 2R elections we consider only the first round. For Approval
Voting, the figures represent the percentage of voters who vote for the candidate
(these percentages do not sum to 100). Single Transferable Vote is not a score
method, but one can compute the Borda scores of the candidates in the STV ballots
and this is how the graph pertaining to STV is constructed.
One can see that as time goes, votes gather on two (for 1R elections) or three
(for 2R elections) candidates. The three viable candidates are always the same for
2R elections (candidates B,C,D), but for 1R elections the pair of viable candidates
is not the same in all elections (the pairs of viable candidates are always composed
of two candidates among the set B, C, D). The pictures for AV and STV do not
show any time-dependence effect.
These aggregate results show that our protocol is able to implement in the labo-
ratory several of the theoretical issues about voting rules: with the same preference
profile, voting rules designate the Condorcet winner (Approval Voting), or not (STV),
or designate a candidate which depends on history (1R and 2R). For additional analy-
ses of those aggregate results, see Blais & al. (2007, 2008).
4 Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting in 1R
and 2R elections
We start with an analysis of individual behavior for 1R and 2R elections. We first
describe our model of strategic voting; a more detailed and technical presentation
of the model is presented in the technical appendix. As a benchmark to which
compare the performance of the strategic model, we also describe the sincere voting
model. We also introduce another model of individual behavior combining properties
from the first two models, labelled heuristics voting. Section 5 tests the models
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with the individual data coming from the experiments, and ascertain their relative
performance.
Note that in a second round of a two-round election, the choice faced by voters is
very simple: they have to vote for one candidate among the two run-off candidates. In
particular, voting for the candidate associated with the highest monetary payoff is a
dominant strategy. Therefore, the models we propose below are intended to describe
behavior in the first round of 2R elections; in the sequel, when we talk about behavior
and scores in 2R elections, unless otherwise specified, we mean behavior and scores
in the first round.
4.1 Strategic voting
By strategic behavior we mean that an individual, at a given date t, chooses an action
(a vote) which maximizes her expected utility given her belief about how the other
voters will vote in the same election. Strategic voting is understood, in this paper, in
the strict rational choice perspective (see Downs 1957, Myerson &Weber 1993).9 We
assume that voters are purely instrumental and that there is no expressive voting,
so that the only outcome that matters is who wins the election. Besides, the utility
of a voter is her monetary payoff.
For each candidate v, voters evaluate the likelihood of the potential outcomes of
the election (who wins the election) if they vote for candidate v, and they compute
the associated expected utility. They vote for the candidate yielding the highest
expected utility.
To be more specific, we introduce the following notation: there are I voters,
i = 1, 2, ..., I, and 5 candidates : c = A,B,C,D,E. The monetary payoff received by
voter i if candidate c wins the election is denoted by ui(c). Let us denote by pi(c, v)
the subjective probability that voter i assigns to the event “candidate c wins the
election”, conditional on her casting her ballot for candidate v. Given these beliefs,
if voter i votes for candidate v, she gets the expected utilityWi(v) =
P
c pi(c, v)ui(c).
Voter i votes for a candidate v∗ s. t.: Wi(v∗) = maxv∈{A,B,C,D,E}Wi(v).
For example, if candidate c is perceived to be a sure winner, then whatever the
vote decision v of voter i, pi(c, v) = 1 and pi(c0, v) = 0, for all c0 other that c.
In such a case, voter i gets the same expected utility whoever she votes for, since
9Note that the definition of strategic voting we use here does not coincide with that which
is sometimes given in the literature in political science. Indeed, this literature has traditionally
opposed a sincere and a strategic (or sophisticated) voter, where a voter is said to be strategic only
when she deserts her preferred option (Alvarez & Nagler 2000). Such strategic voting needs not be
utility maximizing.
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candidate c will be elected no matter what she does. In that case, Wi(v) = ui(c),
for all v ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}. Any vote is compatible with the strategic model in that
case. That is why the empirical analysis will be restricted to unique predictions (see
below).
This model leaves open the question of the form of the probabilities pi(c, v), which
reflect the predictions that voter imakes regarding other voters’ behavior. We have to
make assumptions regarding these probabilities. We will assume here that voters are
able to correctly predict other voters’ behavior (“rational expectation” assumption).
This assumption is common in economic theory. It lacks realism because it amounts
to postulate that the voter “knows” something which has not taken place yet. But
it is theoretically attractive because it avoids the difficult question of the belief
formation process. Note that under this assumption, the only case where a voter is
pivotal in 1R elections for example– and thus where she is not indifferent between
voting for any candidate– is when the vote gap between the first two candidates
(not taking into account her own vote) is strictly less that 2 (either 1 or 0). To allow
the model to make more unique predictions, we draw on the refinement literature
in game theory and consider “trembled” beliefs (Selten, 1975; Myerson, 1991 ch.
5), and assume that each voter considers that with a small probability ε, one voter
exactly is going to make a ”mistake”, by deviating from her actual action and voting
with an equal probability for any of the remaining four candidates. The introduction
of a small noise increases the chances that any voter becomes pivotal: under this
assumption, a voter can be pivotal when the vote gap between the first two candidates
in strictly less that 4. When there is a unique best response for the voter under the
former "noiseless" assumption, this action is still the unique best response with small
“trembles” in other voters’ votes (ε small); but when the best response under the
noiseless assumption is not unique, considering small trembles may break ties among
the candidates in this set.
Other assumptions are possible about voters’ beliefs: they might for example also
have “myopic”, or adaptive, anticipations. In the appendix, we discuss this possi-
bility, precisely describe how to compute the pi(c, v) under the various assumptions,
and compare their performance, which happen to be quite similar. For ease of ex-
position, we report in the main text only the findings based on the ”noisy rational
expectation” assumption.
4.2 Sincere voting
For 1R and 2R elections, the simplest behavior that can be postulated is “sin-
cere” voting, which means that the individual votes for the candidate whose po-
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sition is closest to her own position. With our notation, in plurality one round
and majority two round elections, individual i votes for a candidate v∗ such that:
ui(v∗) = maxv∈{A,B,C,D,E} ui(v).
This model makes a unique prediction as to how a voter should vote, except if
the voter’s position is equally distant from two adjacent candidates, which is the case
of voters on the 8th and 12th position on our axis. The sincere prediction does not
depend on history.
4.3 Heuristic voting
The general idea of the heuristic voting model we propose is that voters vote sincerely
in the set of ”viable” candidates. The viability of candidates is defined by a general
rule, specified in each electoral system. Inspired by the rule given by Gary Cox (1997)
that there areM +1 viable candidates, M being the district magnitude, we test two
heuristics. The “Top-Two heuristics” posits that voters choose the candidate they
feel closer among the candidates who obtained the two highest scores, either in the
previous election (under the ”myopic” assumption) or in the current election (under
the ”rational expectations” assumption). This rule should apply to 1R electoral
systems. The “Top-Three heuristics” (either myopic or rational) posits that voters
choose the candidate they feel the closest to, among the top three candidates. This
heuristics should apply to 2R electoral systems since the first round of a 2R system
can be viewed as having a magnitude of two, two candidates moving to the second
round.
Note that in 1R elections, the Strategic and Top-Two models are almost identical,
both in principle and in practice; the difference is that the strategic theory (in the
version we use) does not provide a unique recommendation when the first-ranked
candidate is four or more votes ahead of the second-ranked one, whereas the top-two
theory does.10
10Over the past two decades, several authors have discussed the implications of citizen’s limited
competence and widespread political ignorance, and discussed the possible use of heuristics. As
Sniderman et al. (1991) have argued, it is possible for people to reason about politics without
a large amount of knowledge thanks to heuristics. Heuristics, in this context, can be defined as
‘judgemental shortcuts, efficient ways to organize and simplify political choice’. The heuristics we
consider here are linked to the structure of competition rather than policies or issues.
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5 Test of the models
The general approach is to compare the predictions of the theoretical models with
the observations. It consists in computing for each theory the predictions in terms
of individual voting behavior and to determine how many times these predictions
coincide with observations (Hildebrand & al. 1977).
5.1 Results for One-Round elections
The columns of the top part of Table 2 indicate the percentage of correct predic-
tions, at different dates, for the various models with respect to 1R elections. Each
percentage is computed with respect to the cases where the theory makes a unique
and testable prediction.
Sincere voting makes a unique prediction except if the voter’s position is precisely
in between two adjacent candidates. If we restrict attention to the cases of unique
predictions, we observe that the sincere voting theory perfors rather poorly: it ex-
plains about 69% of the votes in the initial election, but this percentage is decreasing
to 45 % in the last election. Except for the initial elections, sincere voting is not a
good model.
The Strategic model performs very well when elections are repeated. This is in
line with previous experiments by Forsythe et al. (1993, 1996) on plurality elec-
tions, showing that repeated elections allow convergence on two main candidates, as
predicted by Duverger’s law.
The Top-Two model also performs very well. As already noted, the strategic and
Top-Two models yield almost identical predictions. Maybe surprisingly, the Top-
Three model works quite well too, especially in early rounds where it outperforms
the Top-Two model. To explain this fact, note that the Top-Two and Top-Three
models very often make the same recommendations. They differ when the voter’s
preferred candidate among candidates B, C, and D (which were in most sessions the
three candidates gathering the most votes) is ranked third. This is for instance the
case for an extreme-right voter when D is ranked third after B and C. In such a
case, the Top-Two model recommends voting for C whereas the Top-Three model
recommends voting for D. If in such a situation a voter deserts her sincere choice E
but moves to support moderate candidate D, instead of C, the Top-Three theory will
better explain her behavior than the Top-Two theory. It seems that in early elections,
this behavior was more frequent; in the last elections, extreme voters where ready
to move further away from their preferred candidates, in line with the prescriptions
of the Top-Two theory (which successfully explains 80% of the decisions in case of
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unique predictions against 67% for the Top-Three theory).
In repeated 1R elections, then, the strategic and heuristic models clearly out-
perform the sincere model. The heuristic model is satisfactory even if it does not
improve over the better theoretically anchored strategic model.
5.2 Results for Two-Round elections
The bottom part of Table 2 indicates the percentage of correct predictions for 2R
elections, at different dates, for the same models.
Again, sincere voting is not satisfactory, except for the initial election. But,
contrary to 1R elections, the strategic model does not perform well either. In this
case, the Top-Three heuristic model is clearly the most appropriate. Why?
One point is in common to strategic behavior in 1R and 2R elections: one should
not vote for a candidate who has no chance to play a role in the election. In 1R elec-
tions, the strategic recommendation almost coincides with voting for one’s preferred
candidate among the two strongest candidates. But much more complex computa-
tions, including anticipations about the second round of the election, are involved in
2R elections.
Consider for instance a voter at position 7, in an election where she perceives the
extreme candidates A and E as having no chance of making it to the second round.
Such a voter should therefore vote either for B, C, or D. She earns 19, 17 or 13 euros
respectively, depending on whether B, C or D is elected. According to our strategic
model, she anticipates that she will earn 17 euros if C goes to the second round
because C will then be elected. If the second round is B against D, each candidate
wins with probability one half, and her expected utility is: (19 + 13)/2 = 16 euros.
Such a voter should rationally vote for C because promoting C to the second round
is the best way to avoid the election of the worst candidate D. This kind of reasoning
is not followed by our subjects. Restricting attention to such voters located either
in position 7 or 13, who in 2R elections should desert their preferred (moderate)
candidate to vote for the centrist candidate C, we observe that 80% voted for their
preferred candidate. See the Appendix for further analyses.
Even though the strategic model fares poorly in two-round elections, individuals
do desert the candidate they are the closest to. In what circumstances and in favor
of which candidates? Remember that strategic behavior in both 1R and 2R elections
requires not to vote for a candidate who has no chance to play a role in the election.
The Top-Three heuristics retains only this aspect of the strategic recommendation,
namely not to vote for an un-viable candidate. It is shown to perform quite well in
2R elections.
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6 Additional evidence in AV and STV elections
Results of the previous section suggest that our subjects vote strategically when
the strategic recommendation is simply to desert a candidate who is performing
poorly, but they do not vote strategically when strategic reasoning asks for a more
sophisticated or counter-intuitive calculus. A brief review of the individual behavior
in AV and STV elections lends support to this conclusion.
6.1 Results for Approval Voting
In order to make strategic predictions at the individual level for AV, we use a slightly
different scheme from the one used for 1R and 2R elections. The reason is that, with
this voting rule, the voter is asked to provide a vote (positive or negative) about all
candidates, including those who have virtually no chance of winning according to the
voter’s own beliefs. When a candidate is perceived as having no chance of winning, a
strategic voter is indifferent between approving and not approving such a candidate.
In 1R and 2R elections, under the noisy assumption as we defined it, the level of noise
was limited: a voter assumed that with a small probability, one voter exactly would
make a mistake (from the reference situation). The probability of higher “orders of
mistakes” (two voters exactly make a mistake, three voters exactly make a mistake,
...) was zero. This left lowest-score candidates with a zero probability of being
elected11 Under AV, such a model does not produce unique predictions as to how a
voter should fill her ballot.
This is why we use in the case of AV a model with higher levels of uncertainty, by
ascribing some positive probabilities to all possible events (although the probability
is exponentially decreasing with the number of “mistakes”). Contrary to what we
have done for 1R and 2R elections, we do not compute the probabilities of the
various outcomes, but instead borrow from the literature on strategic voting under
AV (Laslier 2009). It turns out that the maximization of expected utility with such a
belief is easy to perform and often provides a unique strategic recommendation. This
prediction can be described as follows. The voter focuses on the candidate who is
obtaining the largest number of votes, say c1. All other candidates are evaluated with
respect to this leading candidate c1: the voter approves all candidates she prefers to
c1 and disapproves all candidates she finds worse than c1. The leading candidate is
evaluated by comparison with the second-ranked candidate (the “main challenger”):
the voter approves the leading candidate if and only if she prefers this candidate to
11Yet the model yielded unique predictions because what mattered to the voter was being pivotal
with regards to high-score candidates.
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the main challenger.
Details of this “leading candidate” model are provided in the Appendix. Again it
can defined using myopic or rational anticipations. We use the rational anticipation
variant. This produces 2386 unique predictions for 21 ∗ 6 ∗ 5 ∗ 4 = 2520 votes (21
voters in 6 sessions, approving or not of 5 candidates, in 4 elections). The top part of
Table 3.shows that this model quite satisfactorily explains voters’ choices (in about
87% of the cases) and that this is quite stable over time.
The predictive power of the strategic voting theory is thus very high in this
instance. Note that the strategic model described above leads to behavioral recom-
mendations which are very simple: place your “Approval threshold” around the main
candidate, either just above or just below. Therefore, we suspect that any simple
heuristic based on the viability of candidates (as are the Top-Two or Top-Three
heuristics used for 1R and 2R elections) would yield similar recommendations.
In the AV case, the notion of “sincere voting” does not provide a predictive
theory. Indeed, the definition of “sincere” voting under AV is that a voting ballot is
sincere if and only if there do not exist two candidates c and c0 such that the voter
strictly prefers c to c0 and nevertheless approves of c0 and not of c. This definition
of sincere voting therefore leaves one degree of freedom to the voter since it does
not specify at which level, given her own ranking of the candidates, the voter should
place her threshold of approval. With 5 candidates most voters have 6 sincere ballots
(including the equivalent “full” and the ”empty” ballots). Consequently the notion of
“sincere voting” does not provide clear predictions. Nevertheless, with this definition
we can count in our data, at each election and for each voter, the number of pairs
(c, c0) of candidates such as a violation of sincere voting is observed. Such violations
of sincere voting are very rare in our data: 78 observed pairs out of 5040 (10, 20,
22 and 26 observed pairs at t = 1, 2, 3, 4), that is 1.5% on average. But as noticed
above, this does not mean that the predictive power of sincere voting is 98.5%.
6.2 Results for the Single Transferable Vote
Under STV, voters have many different ballots at their disposal since they are asked
to submit a complete ranking of candidates. For 5 candidates, there are 121 possible
ballots. We look for violations of sincere voting by counting the number of pairs of
candidates (c, c0) with c < c0such that a voter strictly prefers c to c0 but nevertheless
ranks c0 higher than c in her ballot. There are 10 such pairs for each ballot. Overall
we observe 2986 pairs, of which only 300, that is 9%, violate sincerity. (See the
bottom part of Table 3). We therefore find that sincerity is satisfied at 91% for this
voting rule.
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This simple observation enables us to understand what went on in STV elections.
Since voters vote (approximately) sincerely, given our preference profile, candidates
in the set A, E, or C are eliminated first and second. If C is not eliminated at the
second round, then for the third round of the vote transfers the two moderate candi-
dates have more votes than the centrist candidate, who has received no transferred
votes. Therefore the centrist candidate, despite being a Condorcet winner, is always
eliminated before the fourth round.
Sincere voting is clearly a satisfactory theory here. Note that the published liter-
ature on this voting rule does not propose, to our knowledge, a practical solution to
the question of individual strategic voting under STV with five candidates. We have
not attempted to compute the rational strategic recommendation at the individual
level for this voting rule, as we have done for the other rules. These computations
would be similar to, but much more complex than, those for 2R elections. In par-
ticular, the computations would entail specifying each voter’s beliefs regarding how
other voters will rank all the candidates (in order to be able to proceed to the suc-
cessive elimination of candidates). The assumption of fully rational expectations in
this case seems particularly implausible. The myopic version would entail specifying
voters’ beliefs about each individual’s rank ordering of the candidates, a point they
did not fully learn in previous counts (indeed, although the whole counting process
occurs in front of the subjects, only a small part of the relevant information is made
available). Therefore, we did not attempt to test the strategic model for this voting
rule.
Our conclusion regarding the single transferable vote is that the sincere model
is satisfactory. This is in line with the actual practice in countries where parties
recommend a whole ranking of the candidates, therefore relieving voters from having
to elaborate some strategic reasoning (see Farrell & McAllister 2006).
7 Conclusion
Reporting on a series of laboratory experiments, this article has ascertained the
performance of the strategic voting theory in explaining individual behavior under
different voting rules. Strategic voting is defined following the rational choice para-
digm as the maximization of expected utility, given a utility function and a subjective
probability distribution (“belief”) on the possible consequences of actions. Utilities
are controlled as monetary payoffs. Beliefs are endogenous to the history of elections.
We showed that the strategic model performs very well in explaining individual
vote choice in one-round plurality elections, but that it fails to account for individual
behavior in two-round majority elections.
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How can we explain voting decisions in two-round elections? We first observe
that un-viable candidates are massively deserted (which invalidates sincere voting).
Rather, voters rely on a simple heuristics; their behavior is well accounted for by a
“Top-Three heuristics”, whereby voters vote for their preferred candidate among the
three candidates who are perceived as the most likely to win.
We therefore conclude that voters tend to vote strategically if and only if the
strategic reasoning is not too complex, in which case they rely on simple heuristics.
Our observations on Approval voting and Single Transferable vote confirm this hy-
pothesis. In the case of Approval voting, strategic voting is simple and produces no
paradoxical recommendations; we observe that our subjects vote strategically under
this system. On the contrary, voting strategically under STV is a mathematical
puzzle, and we observe that voters vote sincerely.
These findings have to be compared to those based on survey analysis. Rather
than estimating the role of different factors in the econometric “vote equation” as
is usual in this strand of literature, we have proposed to compute predictions of
individual behavior according to three models (sincere voting, strategic voting and
voting according to behavioral heuristics). The amount of “insincere” voting ob-
served in our experiments appears to be higher than that reported in studies based
on surveys (see, especially, the summary table provided in Alvarez and Nagler 2000),
though such comparisons are difficult to make because sincere and strategic choices
are not defined the same way. Why is this amount of insincere voting so high on our
set-up? We would suggest three possibilities. First the amount of insincere voting
may depend on the number of candidates. We had five candidates in our set-up.
Further work is needed, both experimental and survey-based, to determine how the
propensity to vote sincerely is affected by the number of candidates. Secondly, our
findings show that the amount of sincere voting declines over time in 1R and 2R
elections, which indicates that some of our participants learn that they may be bet-
ter off voting insincerely. This raises the question whether voters in real life manage
to learn over time. On one hand, a real election is not immediately followed by
another identical one, as was the case in our experiments. On the other hand, a real
election is one element of a stream of political events about which voters have some
time to learn.Third, in our set-up participants had a clear rank order of preferences
among the five candidates. Blais (2002) has speculated that many voters may have a
clear preference for one candidate and are rather indifferent among the other options,
which weakens any incentive to think strategically. We need better survey evidence
on that matter, and also other experiments in which some voters are placed in such
contexts.
The properties of electoral systems crucially depend on voters’ behavior. Elec-
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toral outcomes critically hinge on whether people vote sincerely, strategically, or
follow another behavioral rule. Our experiments show that the appropriate assump-
tion about voters’ behavior is likely to depend on the voting rule. We conclude that
the sincere model works best for very complex voting systems where strategic com-
putations appear to be insurmountable, that the strategic model performs well in
simple systems, and that the heuristic perspective is most relevant in situations of
moderate complexity.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
A Complements on aggregate results
The following tables provide further information about the outcomes of the elections,
with regards to the electoral rule.
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4
B 4 9 10 8
C 13 8 12 12
D 6 6 1 3
total 23 23 23 23
Table 1: Elections Won by date, One-Round
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4
B 5 5 7 6
C 15 12 13 11
D 3 6 3 6
total 23 23 23 23
Table 2: Elections Won by date, Two-Round
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4
B 3 2 0 0
C 3 4 6 6
D 0 0 0 0
total 6 6 6 6
Table 3: Elections Won by date, AV
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t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4
B 4 2 3 2
C 0 0 0 0
D 0 2 1 2
total 4 4 4 4
Table 4: Elections Won by date, STV
B One Round elections
B.1 Sincere voting theory (1R)
B.1.1 Description
Individuals vote for any candidate that yields the highest payoff if elected. Individual
i votes for a candidate v∗ such that:
ui(v∗) = max
v∈{A,B,C,D,E}
ui(v).
B.1.2 Predictions
Sincere Voting is independent of time. For all voters except those in position 8
and 12, this theory makes a unique prediction. Voters in position 8 are indifferent
between B and C and voters in position 12 are indifferent between D and C.
B.1.3 Test
When we restrict ourselves to unique testable predictions12, this theory correctly
predicts behaviour on 54% of the observations, but this figure hides an important
time-dependency: the predictive quality of the theory is decreasing from 69% at the
first election to 45% at the fourth one; see Table 5
12A prediction, even unique, is not testable in the case of a missing or spoiled ballot, which
explains why the denominators in Table 5 are not exactly the same. We should have 664 sincere
predictions at each date, that is 2656 on the whole. There are very few missing or spoiled ballots
(about 0.3%).
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(1R) t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 662 662 661 662 2647
Correct predictions
455
=69%
363
=55%
322
=49%
296
=45%
1436
=54%
Table 5: Sincere Voting for one-round elections
B.2 Strategic models in 1R elections
B.2.1 Strategic behaviour under the noiseless assumption (1R)
Description with Rational Anticipations. Assumption 1 (Noiseless, Ra-
tional Anticipations) : Each individual has a correct, precise anticipation of other
individuals’ votes at the current election.
In that case,the subjective probabilities pi(c, v) are constructed as follows.
Consider voter i at t-th election in a series (t = 1, 2, 3, 4). Voter i correctly
anticipates the scores of the candidates in election t, net of her own vote. The sub-
jective probabilities pi(c, v) are then easily derived. Let us denote by C1i the set of
first-ranked candidates (the leading candidates), and by C2i the set of closest follow-
ers (considering only other voters’ votes). (i) If the follower(s) is (are) at least two
votes away from the leading candidate(s), if voter i votes for (one of) the leading
candigate(s), this candidate is elected with probability 1, if she votes for any other
candidate, there is a tie between the leading candidates (if there is only one leading
candidate, he is elected for sure).13 (ii) If now the two sets of candidates C1i and
C2i are exactly one vote away: if voter i votes for (one of) the leading candigate(s),
this candidate is elected for sure; if she votes for (one of) the followers, there is a
tie between this candidate and the leading candidates; if she votes for any other
candidate, there is a tie between the leading candidates.14
Predictions. Under these assumptions regarding the pi(c, v) , we compute (using
Mathematica software) for each election (starting from the second election in each
13Formally,
if v ∈ C1i : pi(v, v) = 1 and pi(c, v) = 1 for all c 6= v,
if v /∈ C1i : pi(c, v) = 1|C1i | if c ∈ C
1
i and pi(c, v) = 0 for all c /∈ C1i , where
¯¯
C1i
¯¯
is the number of
leading candidates.
14Formally,
if v ∈ C1i : pi(v, v) = 1 and pi(c, v) = 1 for all c 6= v,
if v ∈ C2i : pi(c, v) = 1|C1i |+1 if c ∈ C
1
i ∪ {v} and pi(c, v) = 0 for all c /∈ C1i ∪ {v},
if v /∈ C1i ∪C2i : pi(c, v) = 1|C1i | if c ∈ C
1
i and pi(c, v) = 0 for all c /∈ C1i .
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1 2 3 4 5 total
823 18 30 343 1722 2936
28.0% 0.6% 1.0% 11.7% 58.7% 100%
Table 6: Multiple Predictions, Noiseless rational anticipations, 1R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 212 269 157 638
Correct predictions
149
= 70%
211
= 78%
139
= 89%
499
= 78%
Table 7: Testing strategic noiseless theory, rational anticipations, 1R
session) and for each individual, her expected utility when she votes for candidate
v ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}: that is Pc pi(c, v)ui(c). We then take the maximum of these
five values. If this maximum is reached for only one candidate, we say that for this
voter at that time, the theory makes a unique prediction regarding how she should
vote. If this maximum is reached for several candidates, the theory only predicts
a subset (which might be the whole set) of candidates from which the voter should
choose.
The table 6 gives the statistics regarding the number of candidates in this subset.
These figures are obtained considering all four dates 1 to 4. The total number of
observations is thus 734× 4 = 2936.
In 823 cases, the theory makes a unique prediction as to vote behaviour and in
1722 cases any observation is compatible with the theory. Note that in 343 cases, it
recommends not to vote for a given candidate.
Test We restrict attention to the last three elections of each series, since we are
interested in comparing the performance of the rational anticipations and myopic
anticipations assumptions, the latter making predictions only for the last three elec-
tions. This theory makes unique predictions in 638 testable cases, of which 499 are
correct, that is 78%. See Table 7.
Comparison with Myopic Anticipations. The “Myopic” version of the theory
is very similar to the “Rational Anticipations” but Assumption 1 becomes:
Assumption 1bis (Noiseless, Myopic Anticipations) : Each individual as-
sumes that during the current election, all voters but herself will vote exactly as they
did in the previous election.
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(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 181 212 270 663
Correct predictions
125
= 69%
167
= 79%
235
= 87%
527
= 79%
Table 8: Testing strategic noiseless theory, myopic anticipations, 1R
Comparing Tables 7 and 8 one can see that the qualitative conclusions to be
drawn from these two variants will be identical.
B.2.2 Strategic behaviour under the noisy assumption (1R)
Description with Rational Anticipation. Assumption 2 (Noisy, Rational
Anticipations) : Each individual belief is a small perturbation of the actual votes
of the other individuals at the current election.
More precisely, consider voter i. Her belief is a probability distribution over the
set of possible behaviour of the other voters. With probability ε (small), one voter
exactly (taken at random among the I − 1 remaining voters) makes a mistake and
does not vote for the intended candidate, but instead, with equal probability, votes
for one of the other four candidates.
Note that the number of unique predictions is higher in the noisy case than in
the noiseless case. Indeed, we take ε extremely close to zero, so that each time the
strategic theory yields a unique prediction under the noiseless assumption, the noisy
theory yields the same unique prediction. To see why the noisy assumptions yields
unique predictions in many other cases, consider for example voter i in the following
situtation: in the current election, not taking into account her own vote, she is sure
that a candidate will be alone ahead leading by two votes (with the rational noiseless
assumption). With this noiseless assumption, voter i is not pivotal: whoever she
votes for, this leading candidate wins with probability 1, and therefore voter i is
indifferent between voting for any candidate. Now, with the noisy assumption, this
voter also assigns a small but positive probability to other events. If ε is small enough,
the most likely event is still by far the situation where this leading candidate is still
two votes ahead. But there is now a small probability that voter i might be pivotal.
Indeed, for example, if one of the voters who is supposed to vote for the leading
candidate rather votes for the second-ranked candidate, then these two candidates
will receive exactly the same number of votes, and in this event, voter i becomes
pivotal.
24
1 2 3 4 5 total
1977 28 12 153 766 2936
67.3% 1.0% 0.4% 5.2% 26.1% 100%
Table 9: Multiple Predictions, Noisy rational anticipations, 1R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 583 512 263 1358
Correct predictions
374
= 64.2%
382
= 74.6%
228
= 86.7%
984
= 72.5%
Table 10: Testing strategic noisy theory, rational anticipations, 1R
Predictions. In that case, the probabilities pi(c, v) are harder to write down in an
explicit way. But they can easily be computed using Mathematica software. Under
these assumptions regarding the pi(c, v), we compute for each election (starting from
the second election in each session) and each individual, heer expected utility when
she votes for candidate v ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}: that is, Pc pi(c, v)ui(c). We then take
the maximum of these five values. If this maximum is reached for only one candidate,
we say that for this voter at that time, the theory makes a unique prediction regarding
how she should vote. If this maximum is reached for several candidates, the theory
only predicts a subset of candidates from which the voter should choose.
Table 9 gives the statistics regarding the number of candidates in this subset.
These figures are obtained considering all four dates 1 to 4. The total number of
observations is thus 734× 4 = 2936.
In 1977 cases, that is 67.3%, the theory makes a unique prediction as to vote be-
haviour. This is much more than what we had with the no-noise assumption (28.0%).
Test. We restrict attention to the last three elections of each series. This theory
makes unique predictions in 1358 testable cases, of which 984 are correct, that is
72.5%. See Table 10.
Comparison with the myopic version. The “Myopic” version of the theory is
very similar to the “Rational Anticipations” but the assumption 2 becomes :
Assumption 2bis (Noisy, Myopic Anticipations) : Each individual belief is
a small perturbation of the actual the vote of the other individuals at the previous
election. We use exactly the same model for the perturbation as before, but the
reference scores are now the scores obtained at the previous election, instead of the
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(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 610 582 513 1705
Correct predictions
390
= 63.9%
431
= 74.1%
426
= 83.0%
1247
= 73.1%
Table 11: Testing strategic noisy theory, myopic anticipations, 1R
current one.
Comparing Tables 10 and 11, one can see that the qualitative conclusions to be
drawn from these two variants will be identical.
B.3 “Top two” theory (1R)
B.3.1 Description.
Individuals vote for their preferred candidate among the two candidates that get the
highest two numbers of votes in the current (“Rational Anticipation” version) or the
previous (“Myopic” version) election.
More precisely, consider individual i and denote by si(c) is the score (number of
votes) that candidate c obtains in the reference election (the current or the previous
one), taking into account the ballots of all voters but i. Voter i ranks the five
candidates according to those scores. If two candidates at least rank in the first
place, then individual i votes for her preferred candidate among them. If only one
candidate ranks first, she votes for her preferred candidate among the set consituted
of this first-ranked candidate and the candidate(s) getting the second highest score.
B.3.2 Predictions.
This theory makes unique predictions in almost all cases, double predictions may
occur when a voter’s position is just between two candidates.
B.3.3 Test.
This theory correctly predicts behaviour on approximately 70% of the observations.
Tables 12 and 13 show the time-evolution, and show again that the two versions
“rational anticipations” and “myopic anticipations” are similar.
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(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 695 695 693 2083
Correct predictions
422
= 60.7%
523
= 75.3%
555
= 80.1%
1500
= 72.0%
Table 12: Testing Top-Two theory, rational anticipations, 1R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 692 694 696 2082
Correct predictions
412
= 59.5%
494
= 71.2%
573
= 82.3%
1479
71.0= %
Table 13: Testing Top-Two theory, myopic anticipations, 1R
B.4 “Top three” theory (1R)
B.4.1 Description.
Individuals vote for their preferred candidate among the three candidates that got
the highest three numbers of votes in the reference (current or previous) election.
More precisely,
- if three candidates at least rank in the first place, the individual votes for her
preferred candidate among them,
- if two candidates exactly rank in the first place, the individual votes for her
preferred candidate among the set consituted of those two first-ranked candidates
and the candidate(s) getting the second highest score,
- if one candidate exactly ranks in the first place, and at least two candidates rank
second, the individual votes for her preferred candidate among the set consituted of
this first-ranked candidate and the candidate(s) getting the second highest score,
- if one candidate exactly ranks in the first place and one candidate exactly ranks
scond, the individual votes for her preferred candidate among the set consituted
of this first-ranked candidate, this second-ranked candidate and the candidate(s)
getting the third highest score.
B.4.2 Predictions.
This theory makes unique predictions in almost all cases, double predictions may
occur when a voter’s position is just between two candidates.
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(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 664 668 668 2000
Correct predictions
473
= 71.2%
464
= 69.5%
446
= 66.8%
1383
= 69.1%
Table 14: Testing Top-Three theory, rational anticipations, 1R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 667 663 669 1999
Correct predictions
491
= 73.6%
455
= 68.6%
453
= 67.7%
1399
70.0= %
Table 15: Testing Top-Three theory, myopic anticipations, 1R
B.4.3 Test.
In 1R elections, this theory correctly predicts behaviour on about 70% of the ob-
servations. Tables 14 and 15 show the time-evolution, and show again that the two
versions “rational anticipations” and “myopic anticipations” are similar.
C Two Round elections
C.1 Sincere voting theory in 2R elections
C.1.1 Description.
Exactly the same as for One-round elections. Individuals vote for any candidate that
yields the highest payoff if elected. Individual i votes for a candidate v∗ such that:
u(v∗) = max
v∈{A,B,C,D,E}
ui(v).
C.1.2 Predictions.
Sincere Voting is independent of time. For all voters except those in position 8
and 12, this theory makes a unique prediction. Voters in position 8 are indifferent
between B and C, and voters in position 12 are indifferent between D and C.
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(2R) t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 657 663 663 663 2646
Correct predictions
489
= 74%%
406
= 61%
385
= 58%
363
= 55%
1643
= 62%
Table 16: Sincere Voting for single-name elections
C.1.3 Test.
See Table 13. At the first date, this theory correctly predicts behaviour for 74% of
the observation. This percentage decreases to 55% for fourth elections.15
C.2 Strategic models in 2R elections
Note first that in two-round elections, in the second round with two run-off can-
didates, voting for the candidate associated with the highest monetary payoff is a
dominant strategy. Therefore, we only study strategic behaviour at the first round.
As in the one-round elections, we assume that voters are purely instrumental and
that they select a candidate v∗ such that:
v∗ ∈ argmaxv∈{A,B,C,D,E}
X
c
pi(c, v)ui(c),
where pi(c, v) is the subjective probability that voter i assigns to the event ”candidate
c wins the election”, conditional on her casting a ballot for candidate v at the first
round.
Note that these pi(c, v) involve both beliefs as to how voters will behave at the
second round (if any), and beliefs as to how voters will behave at the first round.
We can decompose this probability pi(c, v) into a sum of two probabilities: the
probability that c wins at the first round (that is, c gets an absolute majority at the
first round) plus the probability of the event ”c makes it to the second round and
wins the second round”. Formally, this can be decomposed as:
pi(c, v) =
X
c0
πi({c, c0}, v)r(c, {c, c0}),
where for c0 6= c, πi({c, c0}, v) is the probability that the unordered pair {c, c0} will
make it to the second round, conditional on voter i voting for candidate v and
15To compare with the other Tables, the figures in the main text are computed for dates 2 to 4.
That is 1154/1989 = 58.0% for 2R.
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r(c, {c, c0}) is voter i’s subjective probability that candidate c wins the run-off election
when the pair {c, c0} is vying at the second round16. To save on notation, we define
πi({c, c}, v) as the probability that c wins at the first round if i votes for v and
r(c, {c, c}) = 1.
Let us first describe the r(c, {c, c0}) when c0 6= c. In all that follows, we assume
that each voter anticipates that at the second-round (if any), each voter will vote for
the candidate closest to her position, and will toss a coin if the two run-off candidates
are equally close to her position:
- the centrist candidateC defeats any other candidate in the second round: r(C, {C, c}) =
1 for c 6= C,
- a moderate candidate (B or D) defeats any extremist candidate (A or E) in the
second round: r(B, {B, c}) = r(D, {D, c}) = 1 for c ∈ {A,E},
- a second round between either the two moderate candidates or the two extrem-
ist candidates results in a tie: r(B, {B,D}) = r(D, {B,D}) = r(A, {A,E}) =
r(E, {A,E}) = 1/2.
In all that follows, we assume that to compute the πi({c, c0}, v), each voter forms
some beliefs about how other voters will behave in the current election, based on
the results of the reference (previous or current) election. Just as we proceeded in
1R-elections, we assume that each voter simply thinks that other voters will behave
at the first-round in the current election either exactly as they did at the first-round
of the reference election, or approximately so.
We now describe more precisely how we compute the pi(c, v) probabilities under
these alternative assumptions, and test this theory.
C.2.1 Strategic behaviour under the noiseless assumption (2R)
Description with Rational Anticipations Assumption 1 (Noiseless, Ra-
tional Anticipations) : Each individual has a correct, precise anticipation of the
vote of the other individuals at the current election.
In that case, the subjective probabilities pi(c, v) are more difficult to write down
explicitly than they were in One-round elections. Given the scores si(c) (number
of votes) that candidate c obtains in the first round of the current election, taking
into account the ballots of all voters but i, with
P
c si(c) = I − 1, what is the
probability πi({c1, c2}, v) that the unordered pair {c1, c2} will make it to the second
round, conditional on voter i voting for candidate v?
16There is no subcript i because all voters have the same beliefs regarding the secound round.
See below.
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We introduce some further notation. Let us denote by si(c, v) is the score (num-
ber of votes) that candidate c obtains in the reference election, if voter i votes
for candidate v and all other voters vote exactly as they do in the refernce elec-
tion. Let us denote by ski (v), k = 1, 2, ..., 5 the k-th largest number in the vector
(si(c, v), c ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}). For example, if si(A, v) = 3, si(B, v) = 5, si(C, v) = 6,
si(D, v) = 5, si(E, v) = 2, then s1i (v) = 6, s2i (v) = 5, s3i (v) = 5, s4i (v) = 3, s5i (v) = 2.
Definition of the probability that candidate c1 wins in the first round,
πi({c1, c2}, v), c1 = c2,
- if si(c1, v) > E[I/2] then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1,
- in all other cases, πi({c1, c2}, v) = 0.
Definition of the πi({c1, c2}, v), c1 6= c2, s1i (v) < E[I/2]
- if si(c1, v) > s3i (v) and si(c2, v) > s3i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1
- if si(c1, v) = si(c2, v) = s1i (v) = s3i (v) > s4i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/3
- if si(c1, v) = si(c2, v) = s1i (v) = s4i (v) > s5i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/6
- if si(c1, v) = si(c2, v) = s1i (v) = s5i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/10
- if si(c1, v) = s1i (v) > si(c2, v) = s2i (v) = s3i (v) > s4i (v), or si(c2, v) = s1i (v) >
si(c1, v) = s2i (v) = s3i (v) > s4i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/2,
- if si(c1, v) = s1i (v) > si(c2, v) = s2i (v) = s4i (v) > s5i (v), or si(c2, v) = s1i (v) >
si(c1, v) = s2i (v) = s4i (v) > s5i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/3,
- if si(c1, v) = s1i (v) > si(c2, v) = s2i (v) = s5i (v), or si(c2, v) = s1i (v) > si(c1, v) =
s2i (v) = s5i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/4,
- in all other cases, πi({c1, c2}, v) = 0.
Now for each pair, a voter can anticipate the outcome of the second round, see
above. And thus this fully describes the pi(c, v).
Predictions. Under these assumptions, we can compute pi(c, v).We compute (us-
ingMathematica software) for each election and each individual, her expected utility
when she votes for candidate v ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}: that is,Pc pi(c, v)ui(c). We then
take the maximum of these five values. If this maximum is reached for only one can-
didate, we say that for this voter at that time, the theory makes a unique prediction
regarding how she should vote. If this maximum is reached for several candidates,
the theory only predicts a subset of candidates from which the voter should choose.
The table 17 provides statistics regarding the number of candidates in this sub-
set. These figures are obtained considering all dates 1 to 4. The total number of
observations is thus 734× 4 = 2936.
One can see that this theory is of little use since it only make a sharp prediction
for 6.6% of the observations.
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1 2 3 4 5 total
194 2 4 160 2576 2936
6.6% 0.1% 0.1% 5.4% 87.7% 100%
Table 17: Multiple predictions, Noiseless rational anticipations, 2R
(2R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 31 47 37 115
Correct predictions
10
= 32.2%
34
= 72.3%
18
= 48.6%
62
= 53.9%
Table 18: Testing strategic noiseless theory, rational anticipations, 2R
Test. For the sake of completeness, Tables 18 and 19 provide the tests of this
theory in the two versions (Rational and Myopic anticipations) for the last three
dates.
C.2.2 Strategic behaviour under the noisy assumption (2R)
Description with Rational Anticipation. Assumption 2 (Noisy, Rational
Anticipations) : Each individual belief is a small perturbation of the actual vote
of the other individuals at the current election. The perturbations are introduced in
the model exactly as for One-Round elections (see above).
Predictions. The Table 20 provides statistics regarding the number of multiple
predictions. These figures are obtained considering all four dates 1 to 4. The total
number of observations is thus 734× 4 = 2936.
In 576 cases, that is 19.6%, the theory makes a unique prediction as to vote
behaviour. This is much more than what we had with the no-noise assumption (194,
that is 6.6%).
(2R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 77 31 48 156
Correct predictions
47
= 61.0%
12
= 38.7%
31
= 64.6%
90
= 57.7%
Table 19: Testing strategic noiseless theory, myopic anticipations, 2R
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1 2 3 4 5 total
576 60 36 196 2068 2936
19.6% 2.0% 1.2% 6.7% 70.4% 100%
Table 20: Multiple predictions, Noisy rational anticipations, 2R
(2R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 127 123 125 375
Correct predictions
68
= 53.5%
75
= 61.0%
79
= 63.2%
222
= 59.2%
Table 21: Testing strategic noisy theory, rational anticipations, 2R
Test. See Table 21. We restrict attention to the last three elections of each series.
This theory makes unique predictions in 375 testable cases, of which 222 are correct,
that is 59.2%, and this figure is increasing with time.
Comparison withe the “Myopic” version. Assumption 2 becomes :
Assumption 2bis (Small noise, Myopic Anticipations) : Each individual belief
is a small perturbation of the actual the vote of the other individuals at the previous
election. More precisely, we use exactly the same model for the perturbation as
before, but the reference scores are now the scores obtained at the previous election
not the current one.
Comparing Tables 21 and 22 one can see that the qualitative conclusions to be
drawn from these two variants will be identical.
C.3 “Top-Two” theory (2R)
C.3.1 Description.
Same theory as for One-round elections. Individuals vote for their preferred candi-
date among the two candidates that obtain the highest two numbers of votes in the
(2R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 199 126 124 449
Correct predictions
106
= 53.3%
66
= 52.4%
72
= 58.1%
244
= 54.3%
Table 22: Testing strategic noisy theory, myopic anticipations, 2R
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(2R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 691 694 695 2080
Correct predictions
386
= 55.9%
424
= 61.1%
466
= 67.1%
1276
= 61.1%
Table 23: Testing the Top-Two theory, rational anticipations, 2R
(2R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 685 690 695 2070
Correct predictions
370
= 54.0%
438
= 63.5%
447
= 64.3%
1255
= 60.6%
Table 24: Testing the Top-Two theory, myopic anticipations, 2R
reference election. The reference election is the current one (in the “rational antici-
pations” version) or the first round of the previous one (in the “myopic anticipations”
version).
C.3.2 Predictions.
This theory makes unique predictions in almost all cases, double predictions may
occur when a voter’s position is just between two candidates.
C.3.3 Test.
This theory correctly predicts behaviour on approximately 60% of the observations.
Tables 23 and 24 show the time-evolution: the percentage of correct predictions
increases. One can verify again again that the two versions “rational anticipations”
and “myopic anticipations” are similar.
C.4 “Top-Three” theory (2R)
C.4.1 Description.
Same theory as for One-round elections. Individuals vote for their preferred candidate
among the three candidates that get the highest two numbers of votes in the reference
election. The reference election is the current one (in the “rational anticipations”
version) or the first round of the previous one (in the “myopic anticipations” version).
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(2R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 663 661 663 1987
Correct predictions
468
= 70.6%
476
= 72.0%
501
= 75.6%
1445
= 72.7%
Table 25: Testing the Top-Three theory, rational anticipations, 2R
(2R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 664 663 661 1988
Correct predictions
467
= 70.3%
483
= 72.9%
494
= 74.7%
1444
= 72.6%
Table 26: Testing the Top-Three theory, myopic anticipations, 2R
C.4.2 Predictions.
This theory makes unique predictions in almost all cases, double predictions may
occur when a voter’s position is just between two candidates.
C.4.3 Test.
This theory correctly predicts behaviour on approximately 73% of the observations.
Tables 25 and 26 show the time-evolution: the percentage of correct predictions
increases. One can verify again that the two versions “rational anticipations” and
“myopic anticipations” are similar.
D Approval voting
The strategic behaviour in that case is derived from the theory in Laslier (2009),
slightly adapted to take care of ties. If there are no ties the behaviour is easily
described: the voter has in mind a reference election (the current election under the
rational anticipation assumption or the previous one under the myopic anticipation
assumption). She compares the leading candidate to the second-ranked one, and she
approves all candidates she prefers to the leader, and no candidate she finds worse
than the leader.
Here is a complete description of this theory. Like in the case of 1R or 2R elections,
si(c) is the total number of votes obtained by candidate c in the reference election,
from voters other than i herself. Denote by
C1i = argmax si
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the set of candidates who tie at the first place in the score vector si and by |C1i | their
number. If i decides to approve of no candidate and the other voters vote like in the
reference election then the winner of the election will be chosen at random in C1i .
Likewise, denote by C2i the set of second-ranked candidates in si.
First case If a single candidate, say c1, has the highest score in the vector si then
i considers the utility she attaches to this candidate
u1i = ui(c
1).
For the other candidates c 6= c1, if ui(c) > u1i , i approves c, and if ui(c) < u1i , i
disapproves of c. For candidate c = c1 himself, as well as for any other candidate
c such that ui(c) = u1i , i compares c with the second-ranked candidates: let
u2i =
1
|C2i |
X
c∈C2i
ui(c),
if u1i > u2i , i approves c1, if u1i < u2i , i disapproves c1, and if c is such that
ui(c) = u2i , i can either approve c∗ or not (no unique prediction).
Second case If two or more candidates have the same highest score in the vector
si then i considers the average utility she attaches to these candidates
u1i =
1
|C1i |
X
c∈C1i
ui(c).
Then if ui(c) > u1i , i approves c, if ui(c) < u1i , i disapproves of c, and if c is
such that ui(c) = u1i , i can either approve c or not (no unique prediction).
With this definition one makes one or several prediction for each vote of a voter
about a candidate. An individual ballot is made of the five votes for the five candi-
dates.
E The sincere-strategic dilemma in 1R and 2R
elections
We provide here further evidence on deviations from strict rationality in 2R elec-
tions. We restrict our attention to the cases when sincere voting is unique but is not
36
1R 2R
Extremists (0-3, 17-20) 86/439 = 20% 11/43 = 26%
Moderates (4-7, 13-16) 68/147 = 46% 74/91 = 81%
Centrists (8-12) 28/56 = 50% 6/13 = 46%
Table 27: Sincere choice in front of a dilemma
“rational”: Strategic voting (in the noisy rational version) makes a unique prediction
and Sincere voting makes another, different, one. These are cases where individual
are facing a dilemma. Table 27 reports how they resolve this dilemma, depending on
their position; the numbers in this Table indicates the percentage of dilemmas which
are resolved by a sincere choice.
One can see that in 2R elections moderate voters whose strategic recommendation
(following our noisy model) would contradict their sincere vote prefer (at 81%) to
follow the sincere recommendation. Most of these individuals are located at positions
7 and 13. Consider for instance a voter at position 7. She earns 19, 17 or 13 euros
respectively depending on whether candidate B, C or D is elected. According to our
model, she anticipates that she will earn 17 euros if C goes to the second round
because C will then be elected. If the second round is B against D, her expected
utility is: (19 + 13)/2 = 16 euros. Such a voter should rationally vote for C because
promoting C to the second round is the best way to avoid the election of the bad
candidateD. It seems that this kind of reasoning leading to “inverse strategic voting”
(Blais 2004) is not followed by our subjects. On the other hand extremist voters in
1R election massively follow the strategic recommendation rather than the sincere
one, under both voting rules.
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                              Table 1: The 23 sessions 
   
Place Date Group Electoral
size systems
1 Paris 06/13/2006 21 2R/1R
2 Paris 12/11/2006 21 2R/1R/AV
3 Paris 12/11/2006 21 1R/2R/AV
4 Paris 12/13/2006 21 2R/1R/AV
5 Paris 12/13/2006 21 1R/2R/AV
6 Paris 12/18/2006 21 2R/1R/STV
7 Paris 12/18/2006 21 1R/2R/STV
8 Paris 12/19/2006 21 2R/1R/STV
9 Paris 12/19/2006 21 1R/2R/STV
10 Paris 1/15/2007 21 2R/1R/AV
11 Paris 1/15/2007 21 1R/2R/AV
12 Lille 12/18/2006 21 2R/1R
13 Lille 12/18/2006 21 1R/2R
14 Lille 12/18/2006 61 2R/1R
15 Lille 12/18/2006 64 1R/2R
16 Montreal 2/19/2007 21 1R/2R
17 Montreal 2/19/2007 21 2R/1R
18 Montreal 2/20/2007 21 1R/2R
19 Montreal 2/20/2007 21 2R/1R
20 Montreal 2/21/2007 63 1R/2R
21 Montreal 2/21/2007 63 2R/1R
22 Montreal 2/22/2007 63 1R/2R
23 Montreal 2/22/2007 63 2R/1R
  
 
Table 2:  Model performance for 1R and 2R elections, by date 
 
 
   
1R: correct predictions Sincere Strategic Top-Two Top-Three
t  1 68.7% 53.8% 49.7% 67.5%
t  2 54.8% 64.2% 60.7% 71.2%
t  3 48.7% 74.6% 75.3% 69.5%
t  4 44.7% 86.7% 80.1% 66.8%
all dates 54.2% 66.7% 66.5% 68.5%
(testable, all dates) 2647 1968 2775 2667
2R: correct predictions Sincere Strategic Top-Two Top-Three
t  1 74.3% 53.8% 43.4% 64.2%
t  2 61.2% 53.5% 55.9% 70.6%
t  3 58.1% 61.0% 61.1% 72.0%
t  4 54.9% 63.2% 67.1% 75.6%
all dates 62.1% 57.3% 56.9% 70.6%
(testable, all dates) 2646 574 2760 2646
  
 
 
Table 3:  Top Part: Strategic voting in AV elections, by date 
 
  Bottom Part: Sincere voting in STV elections, by date    
AV: correct predictions Strategic
t  1 86.7%
t  2 88.3%
t  3 86.7%
t  4 87.4%
all dates 87.3%
(testable, all dates) 2386
STV: correct predictions Sincere
t  1 95.7%
t  2 90.9%
t  3 88.3%
t  4 88.5%
all dates 90.9%
(testable, all dates) 2986
  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the scores of ranked candidates 
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